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NEW YORK v. UNITED STATES: THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND
ENVIRONMENTAL FALLOUT FOR LOW-LEVEL
WASTE DISPOSERS
I.

INTRODUCTION

Disposal of low-level radioactive waste ("LLRW" or "low-level
waste") in the United States has serious repercussions for a broad
spectrum of society.' The United States faces a severe shortage of
disposal space because state governments refuse to take responsibility for the disposal of low-level waste produced within their own
states. 2 Further, the creation of new LLRW disposal facilities is a

1. Originally, low-level radioactive waste posed a serious problem for the scientific community in finding a safe method for disposing of the waste. See Dan M.
Berkovitz, Waste Wars: Did Congress "Nuke" State Sovereignty in the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985?, 11 HARV. ENVrL. L REV. 437, 440-41
(1987); see also DONALD L. BARLarr & JAMES B. STEELE, Foi.nrERMoRE: NuCtEAR
WASTE IN AMERICA 196-201 (1985) (discussing inefficiency of ocean dumping and
shallow burial in water accessible trenches); Michael E. Burns & William Briner,
Setting the Stage, in Low-LEVEL RADiOACrIVE WASTE REGULATION: SCIENCE, PoLrCs
AND FEAR 1, 30-38 (Michael E. Burns ed., 1988) (discussing drawbacks of land and
water disposal of LLRW after World War II).
2. Berkovitz, supra note 1, at 437. The refusal to accept controversial waste is
identified as the NIMBY or "not in my backyard" phenomenon. Id. One locationsiting official eloquently stated the popular sentiment: "Nobody wants this stuff."
Shawn Hubler, Only Californiais on Track for Nuclear Dump, L.A. TIMES, May 20,
1991, at Al.
For example, the failed re-election bid of Nebraska Governor Kay Orr was
attributed to the Governor's participation in LLRW siting decisions. Id. Clearly,
the political ramifications of siting legislation can frighten politicians into inactivity. A similar situation exists at the federal government level. See BAiuzTr &
STEELE, supra note 1, at 48 ("Congress, the White House, and the bureaucracy,
unable to think beyond the next election, have played politics so long with radioactive waste that neglect by default has become official policy."). See Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposak Joint Hearings on S. 1517 and S. 1578 Before the Subcomm. on
Energy Research and Development of the Senate Comm. on Environment and Public Works,
99th Cong., 1st Sess. 47 (1985) [hereinafterJoint Hearings](statement of Rep. Butler
Derrick) (claiming politicians delay process to avoid political consequences of selecting waste disposal site)..
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complex and highly regulated process 3 that causes fierce political
4
disputes and protracted litigation.
In 1980, Congress enacted the Low-Level Radioactive Waste
Policy Act ("LLRWPA") 5 to solve the LLRW disposal facility
shortage. The LLRWPA's ultimate failure to remedy the LLRW
problem led Congress to amend the LLRWPA by enacting the LowLevel Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 (the
"Act").6 The Act encourages states to create new disposal facilities
by: 1) authorizing states to enter into multi-state agreements, such

3. Each state has its own laws governing the selection of low-level radioactive
waste disposal sites. See, e.g., MicH. COMP. LAws ANN.§ 333.1701 (West 1992); N.Y.
EvrL. CONSERV. LAw § 29-0301 (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1993); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 120-70.31-37 (1992). New York's siting laws demonstrate the complexities involved with selecting a location for a waste facility. In New York, the selection of
LLRW disposal facilities is directed by the Commission for Siting Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Facilities. N.Y. E1rrL. CONSERV. LAw § 29-0301 (McKinney
1984 & Supp. 1993). The Commission must find a method of disposal and then
must select prospective sites for a LLRW facility. Id. § 29-0303. The Commission
must then submit environmental impact studies and draft proposals for sites. Id.
After a lengthy public hearing and comment period, the Department of Environmental Conservation must certify that the Commission's site selection conforms
with applicable siting criteria. Id. § 29-0105. An advisory committee, independent
of the Commission, acts as consultant, advisor, and watch-dog. Id. § 29-0501. After
the selection process is complete, any action to establish a permanent LLRW facility, such as applying for licenses, permits or approvals, is subject to agency approval
after a public comment period. Id. § 29-0503. An aggrieved party may seek judicial review of any offensive agency action. Id. § 29-0505(2).
The Commission must also promulgate financing requirements that must be
met by prospective facility operators as a prerequisite to permit approval. Id. § 290701. To further complicate the Commission's task of site selection, New York
provides that the management of LLRW is concurrently under the purview of the
N~w York State Energy Research and Development Authority. N.Y. PUB. AuTH.
LAw § 1854-b (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1993).
4. See, e.g., Western Colo. Congress v. Colorado Dep't of Health, 844 P.2d
1264, 1267 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992) (finding agency procedural error and allowing
case to proceed); Mayerat v. Town Bd. of Ashford, 585 N.Y.S.2d 928, 929 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1992) (allowing town to proceed with siting process because procedural
errors were not made). Richmond County v. North Carolina Low-Level Radioactive Waste Mgmt. Auth., 425 S.E.2d 468, 471 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993) (dismissing case
for lack of justiciable issue).
5. Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-573, 94 Stat.
3347 (1980), repealed by Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of
1985, Pub. L. No. 99-240, 99 Stat. 1842, (1986) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2021b-2021j (1988 & Supp. III 1991)). For purposes of clarity, the 1980 law,
now repealed will be referred to as "LLRWPA." The 1986 amendments, still in
effect, which repealed the 1980 law will be referred to simply as "the Act."
6. Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985, Pub. L. No.
99-240, 99 Stat. 1842, (1986) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2021b-2021j
(1988 & Supp. III 1991)).
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as compacts, 7 to designate new sites;8 (2) providing monetary incentives to designate sites as new LLRW disposal facilities; and (3)
sanctioning penalties for noncompliance with the Act. The
LLRWPA and the Act proved unsuccessful: they maintained the status quo with regard to the availability of LLRW disposal space and
spawned divisiveness among the states. 9 In addition, the constitutionality of both statutes was challenged. 10
In New York v. United States," the United States Supreme Court
upheld the incentive provisions of the Act.' 2 The Court held, however, that the Act's penalty provision forces states to adopt a federal
regulatory program and, therefore, the penalty provision is an unconstitutional use of congressional power.' 3 The court severed the
unconstitutional penalty provision from the Act, thereby preserving
14
the validity of the remainder of the Act.
This Note first analyzes the characteristics of low-level waste.
This Note then reviews the Act and its legislative history. It then
summarizes the recent judicial inquiries into state sovereignty.
Against this background, this Note suggests that the Supreme Court
failed to define the parameters of state sovereignty because it did
not analyze the Act in light of precedent. This Note also assesses
whether states will be motivated to solve the LLRW disposal problem given the absence of any penalty provision.
7. Id. Compacts are congressionally authorized agreements that are contracts
between two or more member states. Joseph R. Prochaska, Comment, Loo-Level
Radioactive Waste Disposal Compacts, 5 VA. J. NAT. RESOURCES LAw 383, 388-89
(1986). Congressional approval of compacts is required by the Compact Clause of
the Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
8. See 42 U.S.C. § 2021d.
9. See BARLITr & STEELE, supra note 1, at 227 (discussing Illinois' defection to
more favorable compact); Michael E. Bums, Living the Past, Facing the Future, in
LoW-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE REGULATION: SCIENCE, PoLmCs AND FEAR 279, 28183 (Michael E. Bums ed., 1988) (listing Maryland and Delaware as states that used
compact process for own interests); Leonard S. Greenberger, Switching Compacts,
PUB. UTIL. FORT., Aug. 1, 1992, at 26 (documenting Wyoming's switch to Northwest compact because its compact site was closing).
10. See Washington State Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Spellman, 684
F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1982) (upholding constitutionality of LLRWPA), cert. denied sub
nom. Don't Waste Wash. Legal Defense Found. v. Washington, 461 U.S. 913
(1983); Michigan v. United States, 773 F. Supp. 997 (W.D. Mich. 1991)(finding Act
constitutional).
11. 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992).
12. New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2425-27.
13. Id. at 2435.
14. Id. at 2434. In its analysis, the Court stated: "[T]he Act is still
operative
and it still serves Congress' objective of encouraging the States to attain local or
regional self-sufficiency in the disposal of low level radioactive waste." Id.
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BACKGROUND

The Characteristics of Low-Level Radioactive Waste

Low-level radioactive waste has never been explicitly defined;
relevant statutes classify it by identifying what it is not. 15 The lowlevel waste described in the Act is produced as a by-product from
many sources, including hospitals, 16 nuclear power plants,' 7 and research facilities.' The amount of LLRW that is generated each
year is unknown 9 because government studies measure only the

15. The Act defines LLRW as "not high-level radioactive waste, spent nuclear
fuel, or byproduct material .... " 42 U.S.C. § 2021b(9)(A). The Act also defines
LLRW by reference to 10 C.F.R. § 61.55. 42 U.S.C. § 2021c(a) (1) (B).
The Code of Federal Regulations uses several factors to classify waste as
LLRW:
Determination of the classification of radioactive waste involves two considerations. First, consideration must be given to the concentration of
long-lived radionuclides (and their shorter-lived precursors) whose potential hazard will persist long after such precautions as institutional controls, improved waste form, and deeper disposal have ceased to be
effective. These precautions delay the time when long-lived radionuclides could cause exposures. In addition, the magnitude of the
potential dose is limited by the concentration and availability of the radionuclide at the time of exposure. Second, consideration must be given
to the concentration of shorter-lived radionuclides for which requirements on institutional controls, waste form, and disposal methods are
effective.
10 C.F.R. § 61.55 (1992). The regulations provide technical specifications for
classes A, B, and C waste, which are all classified as LLRW. Id. Class A waste has
minimal environmental impact even in unstable forms; class B waste has an average half-life of 100 years; class C waste generally has a half-life of greater than 100
years. Berkovitz, supra note 1, at 448 n.52. Waste more radioactive than class C,
generally considered high-level radioactive waste, has a minimum half-life of 500
years. Id.; see also E. William Colglazier & Mary R. English, Low-Level Radioactive
Waste: Can New Disposal Sites Be Found, 53 TENN. L. REV. 621, 625-26 (1986).
16. Berkovitz, supra note 1, at 440. The negative impact the closure of LLRW
disposal sites would have had on hospitals was cited as a major impetus for passing
the Act. See 131 CONG. REc. S18,103 (daily ed. Dec. 19, 1985) (statement of Sen.
Hart).
17. See Colglazier & English, supra note 15, at 625-26. The low-level waste produced at nuclear power plants consists of contaminated equipment and clothing.
Id.
18. Berkovitz, supra note 1, at 439-40. Examples of LLRW include equipment
used to protect the wearer from radiation, specimens and laboratory equipment
contaminated with radioactive waste, and contaminated soil. Id. at 440.
19. Frank L. Parker, Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal in Low-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE REGULATION: SCIENCE, PoLIrrcs AND FEAR 85, 92 (Michael E. Bums,
ed., 1988), During Congressional debate, one senator estimated that as much as
3.8 million cubic feet was being produced each year during the 1980s. 137 CONG.
Rzc. S14,561 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1991) (statement of Sen. Dodd).
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amount of LLRW that is shipped for disposal and not the amount
20
that is generated.
LLRW is hazardous, but its effects on human health vary with
the duration and concentration of exposure to the waste and the
radioactivity level of the particular waste. 2 1 Although scientists disa22
gree as to the threshold at which human health is endangered,
scientists agree that prolonged exposure to low-level radiation is
23
deleterious to human health.
Society's fear of LLRW results, in large part, from an inaccurate perception of the risks associated with exposure to low-level
waste. First, the public confuses LLRW with the more hazardous
substance, high-level radioactive waste. 2 4 Second, the public believes erroneous reports that LLRW, by itself, is highly dangerous. 25
Third, the public fears the wide variety of hazardous waste that is
26
improperly disposed of with LLRW.
20. BARLETT & STEELE, supra note 1, at 181-94. Private studies have suggested
that each year, nearly two million cubic feet of LLRW were unaccounted for in the
government studies. Id. at 185.
The disparity in these studies suggests that Senator Kerry's estimates of LLRW
generation, presented during debate in Congress on proposed amendments to the
Act, were inaccurate. 138 CONG. REC. S10,983 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1992) (statement
of Sen. Kerry). Senator Kerry stated there was a 50% decrease in the production
of LLRW, from a peak of 3.4 million cubic feet to 1.5 million cubic feet in 1988.
Id.
21. See BARLETT & STEELE, supra note 1, at 306-09 (discussing deaths from excessive exposure to radiation, including scientist Marie Curie's death). As one
writer stated, there is no evidence of deleterious health effects from "environmental [minimal] exposure" to LLRW, although the author conceded that prolonged
and excessive exposure does produce harmful effects. Don G. Scroggin, Low-Level
Radiation:CancerRisk Assessment and Government Regulation to ProtectPublic Health, in
Low-LEvEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE REGULATION: SCIENCE, PoLrrCs AND FEAR 159, 166
(Michael E. Bums ed., 1988).
22. Rosalyn S. Yalow, BiologicEffects of Low-Level Radiation, in Low-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE REGULATION: SCIENCE, POLITICS AND FEAR 239, 254-55 (Michael E.
Burns ed., 1988) (stating lack of meaningful data makes it impossible to assess
health risks from exposure to LLRW); see BARLETr & STEELE, supra note 1, at 29899. Since there are so many variables in these studies, the results are contradictory
and are often used to support inconsistent positions. Id. at 299 (stating radiation
causes cancer and leukemia, although scientists cannot draw meaningful conclusions from this knowledge).
23. BARLETT & STEELE, supra note 1, at 298. Low-level waste disposal sites are
normally safe because excessive exposure to LLRW, as distinguished from environmental or accidental exposure, is unlikely to occur at the sites. See id. at 181.
24. Timothy L. Peckinpaugh, The Politics of Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal
in LOw-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE REGULATION: SCIENCE, POLITICS AND FEAR 45
(Michael E. Bums ed., 1988).
25. See BARLETT & STEELE, supra note 1, at 185-95.
26. See id. at 181 (providing examples of high-level waste mixed in with lowlevel waste at LLRW disposal sites).
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The Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act of 1980

Prior to 1980, low-level waste disposal was virtually neglected by
federal and state legislators.2 7 There were only three operational
LLRW disposal sites in the United States in 1980.28 These disposal
sites were overwhelmed by the increasing volume of LLRW.2 9 Congress passed the LLRWPA in response to threats to permanently
close the sites and actual, though temporary, closures at two of the
30
sites.
By enacting the LLRWPA, Congress encouraged states to regulate low-level waste disposal through the formation of regional compacts that required congressional approval. 3 ' Congress believed
that these compacts, providing for rotation of LLRW disposal sites
among compact states, would ease the shortage of disposal space
and ensure an equal burden on member states.3 2 Under LLRWPA,
compacts could refuse LLRW produced outside of the compact
from compact facilities after 1986.33 However, no compact was rati-

fied by Congress before the LLRWPA was superceded. 34 LLRWPA's
27. See Prochaska, supra note 7, at 385-86.
28. Joint Hearings, supra note 2, at 289-97. These sites were located in Hanford, Washington; Beatty, Nevada; and Barnwell, South Carolina. Id. Of the six
LLRW sites that were operational in the beginning of the 1970s, three were forced
to close before 1980. Id. at 289. A facility in Sheffield, Illinois was closed in 1978
when it reached maximum capacity. Id. Through at least September 1992, that
facility had experienced seepage of waste and still required cleanup and maintenance. See Danni Sabota, Local Waste Firm Wins Latest Round in Legal Battle with State
of Illinois, Hous. Bus.J., Sept. 14, 1992, § 1, at 18. The site at Maxey Flats in Kentucky was closed in 1977 when contaminated water leaked into its waste trenches.
Joint Hearings,supranote 2, at 289-91. As of August 1993, the cleanup of the Maxey
Flats facility was still in progress. Court Rules Kentucky Must Pay American Ecologyfor
Maxey Flats Costs, HAZARDous WASTE Bus., August 11, 1993, at 3. The facility in
West Valley, New York, closed in 1975, after experiencing leakage similar to that
which later occurred at Maxey Flats. Authorities had decontaminated at least a
portion of the site as of December 1993. E. Michael Blake, Twenty Nagging Questions and Not-Necessarily-SatisfyingAnswers About LLW Management in the United States,
NUCLEAR NEws, December 1993, at 42.
29. See BARLETr & STEELE, supra note 1, at 222-23.
30. See Berkovitz, supra note 1, at 441. The Beatty, Nevada site was closed
twice in 1979, ostensibly due to mishandling of LLRW during transport to the site.
Id. The Hanford, Washington facility was also temporarily closed in 1979, which
prompted the governor of South Carolina to order reductions in the waste accepted at the Barnwell site. Id.
31. LLRWPA § 4(a)(2), Pub. L. No. 96-573, 94 Stat. 3347, 3348 (1980) (current version codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2021d (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)). The Act currently requires congressional approval and review. 42 U.S.C. § 2021d(c),(d).
32. 131 CONG. REc. S18,103 (daily ed. Dec. 19, 1985) (statement of Sen. Hart).
33. LLRWPA § (4) (a) (2) (B). As amended by the Act, the law still permits
compacts to refuse LLRW generated outside the compact. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2021d(c).
34. See Peckinpaugh, supra note 24, at 48-49.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol5/iss1/10

6

Traband: New York v. United States: The Constitutional and Environmental F
1994]

NEW YoRK V. UNITED STATES

greatest success came from pressuring the existing sites to continue
5
to accept LLRW from all states, at least through 1985.3
By 1985, however, no state had even selected a location for a
new disposal site.3 6 In addition to this lack of progress, each of the
three operational sites planned to close in 1986, as authorized by
the LLRWPA. 37 Congress amended the LLRWPA in response to
the threatened closure of several nuclear research facilities, medical
38
centers, and the three operational LLRW sites.
C.

The Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of
1985

Congress enacted the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy
Amendments Act late in the 1985 term.3 9 The Act retained the
LLRWPA's emphasis on multi-state compacts as the preferred
method for regulating the disposal of low-level waste. 4° Unlike the
LLRWPA, the Act established a number of deadlines for states to
meet. 41 The three major provisions of the Act provided for state
surcharges on private waste generators, access denial by compacts
in compliance with the Act's deadlines, and the take-title penalty
42
for states that were not in compliance with the Act's deadlines.
35. Id Peckinpaugh suggests that the LLRWPA's lack of incentives encouraged states to delay the compact approval process. Id.; see also 131 CONG. REC.
S18,108 (daily ed. Dec. 19, 1985) (statement of Sen. Bradley) (attributing failure of
LLRWPA to lack of incentives).
36. Peckinpaugh, supra note 24, at 48.
37. LLRWPA § 4(a) (2) (B). Any congressionally approved compact could
deny access to its LLRW facility after January 1986. Id.; see also 131 CoNG. -REc.
S18,116-17 (daily ed. Dec. 19, 1985) (statement of Sen. Thurmond) (reiterating
threats to shut down sites in 1986 if legislation was not passed).
38. See Berkovitz, supra note 1, at 442. Berkovitz theorizes that a "national
disposal system with only three sites for waste from all fifty states was vulnerable to
disruption. Even a temporary shutdown of any of the sites, for whatever reason,
could have created a widespread health and safety crisis." Id.; see also 131 CONG.
REc. S18,106 (daily ed. Dec. 19, 1985) (statement of Sen. Thurmond)(stating
amendment of LLRWPA was necessary to "avert a potential nationwide crisis.").
39. 131 CONG. REc. S18,103 (daily ed. Dec. 19, 1985) (statement of Sen. Hart).
The Act set volume caps for the three sites, foreclosing the possibility that they will
continue to function indefinitely as the nation's repositories. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2021e(b).
40. 42 U.S.C. § 2021b. Congress ratified seven compacts in 1985. Low-Level
Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985, subtitle B, Pub. L. No. 99-240,
§§ 221-227, 99 Stat. 1860-1924 (1985) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2021d(d)); see Peckinpaugh, supra note 24, at 53-55.
41. 131 CONG. REc. S18,103-04 (daily ed. Dec. 19, 1985) (statement of Sen.
Hart).
42. 42 U.S.C. § 2021e.
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Under the surcharge provision of the Act, states can impose
surcharges on low-level waste generators. 43 The surcharges could
then be used to help fund the establishment of new LLRW disposal
44
sites.
Under the access denial provision, compact states are required
to meet certain deadlines so they can exclude noncompliant states
from using compact LLRW disposal sites.45 Compacts and states
that establish their own LLRW facilities have to meet certain deadlines to show they were making progress in establishing these new
LLRW facilities. 4 6 States are penalized for failing to meet these
deadlines. 47 These penalties include increased state surcharges on
waste generators, and the denial of access to compact LLRW disposal facilities until the state or compact is in compliance with the
48
applicable milestone.
Under the penalty provision, states that had not complied with
the deadlines were required to take possession of all low-level waste
generated within their state. 49 The take-tide section was designed
to "provide sufficient inducement to persuade even recalcitrant
43. 42 U.S.C. § 2021e(d)(1). The provision requires the Secretary of Energy
to collect 25% of these surcharges from the states and to retain these funds in an
escrow account. 42 U.S.C. § 2021e(d) (2) (A). The retained surcharges are then
refunded when states comply with the deadlines imposed by the Act. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2021e(d) (2) (B). This section established rebate schedules based on compliance
with the milestones in July 1986,January 1988, andJanuary 1990. Id. The Act also
provides that:
[a] ny amount paid under subparagraphs (B) or (C) [i.e., the rebates] may
only be used to(I) establish low-level radioactive waste disposal facilities;
(II) mitigate the impact of low-level radioactive waste disposal facilities on the host State;
(III) regulate low-level radioactive waste disposal facilities; or
(IV) ensure the decommissioning, closure, and care during the period of institutional control of low-level radioactive waste disposal
facilities.
42 U.S.C. § 2021e(d) (2) (E) (i).
44. Id.
45. 42 U.S.C. § 2021e(e).
46. 42 U.S.C. § 2021e(e) (1). The first deadline required that the state either
prove it was a member of a ratified compact, or show its intent to establish its own
site byJuly 1, 1986. Id. Second, the compacts had to identify the prospective siting
state within the compact and noncompact states had to create a siting plan by
January 1, 1988. Id. The third deadline, January 1, 1990, required either an application for a license to operate a disposal facility or certification of an intent to
comply by 1993. Id. Finally, the Act required the submission of a complete application to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for a license to operate a new LLRW
facility byJanuary 1, 1992. Id.
47. 42 U.S.C. § 2021e(e) (2).
48. Id.
49. 42 U.S.C. § 2021e(d) (2) (C). As originally enacted, the take-title section
provided:

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol5/iss1/10

8

Traband: New York v. United States: The Constitutional and Environmental F

1994]

NEW YoRK V. UNITED STATES

States to become part of the low-level compact process and work
diligently to open new disposal facilities." 50
D.

Constitutional Inquiries into Infringements on State
Sovereignty

51
Although Congress can enact legislation affecting the states,
the Tenth Amendment prevents Congress from violating a state's
sovereignty. 52 However, the extent of a state's sovereignty and its
power to regulate independent of congressional interference is
unclear.
The inquiry into whether a federal statute violates state sovereignty begins from a historical perspective with National League of
Cities v. Usey.53 In National League of Cities, the Supreme Court held
that a federal wage statute that was extended to regulate the working conditions of state government employees 54 violated the Tenth
Amendment. 55 The Court used a three-prong test to determine
If, byJanuary 1, 1993, a State (or, where applicable, a compact region) in
which low-level radioactive waste is generated is unable to provide for the
disposal of all such waste generated within such State or compact region(i) each state in which such waste is generated, upon the request of the generator or owner of the waste, shall take title to
the waste, shall be obligated to take possession of the waste, and
shall be liable for all damages directly or indirectly incurred by
such generator or owner as a consequence of the failure of the
State to take possession of the waste as soon after January 1,
1993 as the generator or owner notifies the State that the waste
is available for shipment; or
(ii) if such State elects not to take title to, take possession of,
and assume liability for such waste... twenty-five per centum of
any amount collected by a State... shall be repaid, with interest,
to each generator from whom such surcharge was collected ....
Id. States that failed to provide for the disposal of all LLRW by January 1, 1996
could not avail themselves of a surcharge refund for LLRW generators. Id.
50. 131 CONG. REc. S18,104 (daily ed. Dec. 19, 1985) (statement of Sen. Hart).
51. New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2417-19 (1992).
52. See United States v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 643, 648-49 (1961). The Tenth
Amendment states: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or
to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.
53. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
54. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 203 (1970 &
Supp. IV 1974). The statute amended the Fair Labor Standards Act to include all
government employees, whereas prior to the amendments government employees
were exempted and the provisions regulating wages applied only to private employers. NationalLeague of Cities, 426 U.S. at 839.
55. NationalLeague of Cities, 426 U.S. at 842-43. The Court overruled Maryland
v. Wirtz, in which the Court had upheld the provisions of the same amended statute. Id. at 840 (citing Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968)). The Court stated:
"We have repeatedly recognized that there are attributes of sovereignty attaching
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whether the statute violated state sovereignty. 56 Under the test, the
statute was unconstitutional if it (1) regulated the "States as
States," 57 (2) regulated areas that were "attribute [s] of state sovereignty",58 and (3) forced states to implement federal policies in areas of "traditional government functions."5 9 The Court held that
the federal wage statute was unconstitutional because it violated
each prong of the test.6° The Court considered the substantial
costs that the statute imposed on the states a significant factor in
reaching its decision. 6 1
Although National League of Cities was never used to invalidate
another federal statute, 62 the Court, in several cases, used the National League of Cities analysis to test for violations of state sovereignty. In 1981, the Supreme Court in Hodel v. Virginia Surface
Mining and Reclamation Ass'

(Virginia Mining)65 upheld a federal

mining statute, stating that it did not coerce the state to adopt a
federal program or to expend its own resources at the direction of
the federal govemment. 64 The Virginia Mining statute directed
states to either implement their own regulatory program consistent
with federal guidelines, or vacate the field to allow for a federal
regulatory program. 65 The Court found it significant that the statute provided states with a choice and did not command states to
to every state government which may not be impaired by Congress. ... " National
League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 845.
56. William A. Isaacson, Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority:
Antifederalism Revisited, 21 U. TOL. L. REV. 147, 150 (1989).
57. NationalLeague of Cities, 426 U.S. at 854-56. The Court stated:
We have reaffirmed today that the States as States stand on a quite different footing from an individual or a corporation when challenging the
exercise of Congress' power to regulate commerce .... Congress may not
exercise that [commerce] power so as to force directly upon the States its
choices as to how essential decisions regarding the conduct of integral
governmental functions are to be made.
Id. at 854-55.
58. NationalLeague of Cities, 426 U.S. at 845.
59. Id. at 852.
60. Id. at 845-47.
61. Id. at 851.
62. Deborah Jones Merritt, The GuaranteeClause and State Autonomy: Federalism
for a Third Century, 88 COLuM. L. Rxv. 1, 12 (1988).

63. 452 U.S. 264 (1981). An association of coal companies, affected landowners, and the state of Virginia challenged the constitutionality of the Surface Mining
and Reclamation Act of 1977. Id. at 273. The Court found that Congress had a
rational basis for the Surface Mining Act, and therefore, it did not violate the Commerce Clause. Id. at 283.
64. Id. at 268.
65. Virginia Mining,452 U.S. at 283-90. The Court held the statute was constitutional because it governed "only the activities of coal mine operators who are
private individuals and businesses .... Thus there can be no suggestion that the
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regulate. Therefore, according to the Court, the statute did not
violate the Tenth Amendment under the National League of Cities
test.66
In 1982, in Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. v. Mississippi
6 7
(FERC),
the Supreme Court upheld at federal energy statute that
directed states to consider federal guidelines when they promulgated energy regulations. 68 The statute did not command states to
abide by federal guidelines, according to the Court.69 In her dissent, Justice O'Connor termed the majority's analysis of the choice
70
offered to states an "absurdity."
71
In 1985, in Garciav. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,
the Supreme Court overturned National League of Cities.72 The
Court replaced the NationalLeague of Cities test 73 with the "political
Act commandeers the legislative processes of the States by directly compelling
them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program." Id. at 288.
Other provisions of the statute allowed state regulation of certain activities in
lieu of federal preemption. Id. The Court found this state regulation was the
product of "co-operative federalism." The Court determined this was not an encroachment on state sovereignty because Congress merely permitted state regulation and did not compel it. Id. at 289-90. The argument that the threat of preemption coerced the state into regulating along federal guidelines was rejected.
Id.
66. Id.
67. 456 U.S. 742 (1982). The state of Mississippi and several state energy
agencies challenged the constitutionality of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies
Act of 1978 ("PURPA"). Id. at 752. The challengers contended that PURPA violated the Tenth Amendment because it directed states to consider federal energy
regulations when regulating state utilities. Id. at 746-48. The Court upheld the
statute against the Tenth Amendment challenge. Id. at 771.
68. Id. at 746-52. With regard to the mandatory consideration of federal standards, the Court stated that "[w]hile this Court never has sanctioned explicitly a
federal command to the States to promulgate and enforce laws and regulations,
there are instances where the Court has upheld federal statutory structures that in
effect directed state decisionmakers to take or to refrain from taking certain actions." Id. at 761-62 (citation omitted). Since the states could choose to regulate
according to federal standards or vacate the field, the Court found there was no
evidence of congressional coercion. Id. at 766.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 781 (O'Connor, J., dissenting in part). Justice O'Connor implied
that she felt the statute transformed state legislatures into "field offices of the national bureaucracy." Id. at 777. Justice O'Connor saw the choice offered by the
statute-regulate according to federal guidelines or abandon the field-as hollow,
and therefore, coercive. Id.
71. 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (5-4 decision).
72. Id. at 531.
73. Merritt, supra note 62, at 12-13. As many commentators have suggested,
the National League of Cities doctrine established no parameters as to what "traditional government functions" were. Id.at 13. The GarciaCourt stated that: "The
attempt to draw the boundaries of state regulatory immunity in terms of 'traditional government function' is not only unworkable but is also inconsistent with
established principles of federalism . . . ." Garcia, 469 U.S. at 531.
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process" test.74 In doing so the Court reasoned that state sovereignty is best protected by the safeguards inherent in the political
system. 75 Under the Garcia test, in order to prove that a federal
statute is unconstitutional, a state must prove that the political process failed to protect its democratic interests during the passage of
76
the challenged federal statute.
III.

DISCUSSION

A. Facts, Procedure, and Holding of New York v. United States
The state of New York and two counties within the state77 sued
the United States, alleging that the Act violated the Tenth Amendment.78

Both the District Court for the Northern District of New

York 79 and the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that
the Act was constitutional.8 0 The Second Circuit applied the Garcia
test and concluded that the Act did not infringe upon New York's
sovereignty. 8 ' The court stated that the LLRWPA and the Act were
74. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 556. Justice Brennan proposed a similar test in his
dissent in NationalLeague of Cities. See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S.
833, 876-78 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan stated:
Judicial restraint in this area merely recognizes that the political branches
of our Government are structured to protect the interests of the States...
and that the States are fully able to protect their own interests in the
process. Congress is constituted of representatives in both the Senate
and House elected from the States. Decisions upon the extent of federal
intervention under the Commerce Clause into the affairs of the States are
in that sense decisions of the States themselves.
Id. (citations omitted).
75. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 552, 556-57. The Court reasoned that "the principal
and basic limit on the federal commerce power is that inherent in all congressional action-the built-in restraints that our system provides through state participation in federal governmental action. The political process ensures that laws that
unduly burden the States will not be promulgated." Id. at 556.
76. Id. The Garciatest was explained by the Court in South Carolinav. Baker in
which the Court stated that a statute is unconstitutional by virtue of the Tenth
Amendment only if it is the product of a seriously flawed political process. South
Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 513-14 (1988).
77. New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2416. Allegany and Cortland counties in New York
had been designated as the proposed locations of new LLRW sites. The counties
challenged the Act to prevent the development of these sites. Id. at 2416-17. Those
states with operational LLRW sites-Washington, Nevada, and South Carolinaintervened as defendants, ostensibly to protect the exclusionary provisions in the
Act. Id. at 2417.
78. New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2417.
79. New York v. United States, 757 F. Supp. 10 (N.D.N.Y. 1990).
80. New York v. United States, 942 F.2d 114 (2d Cir. 1991).
81. New York, 942 F.2d at 119-20. In upholding the constitutionality of the
Act, the Second Circuit cited various examples of state participation during the
Act's passage. Id. The court found no "grievous defect in the political process." Id.
at 120.
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"paragons of legislative success, promoting state and federal comity
82
in a fashion rarely seen in national politics."
In New York, the Supreme Court considered whether the Act
infringed on New York's sovereignty by compelling it to regulate
LLRW disposal.8 3 The Court held that the Act's surcharge8 4 and
access denial8 5 provisions were proper uses of congressional
87
power.8 6 The Court, however, held that the take-title provision
was unconstitutional, but the Court severed it from the remainder
of the Act.88

B.

Analysis of the Supreme Court's Holding in New York v.
United States

The Court began its analysis in New York by stating that Congress, with its broad commerce powers,8 9 could regulate low-level
waste disposal. 90 The Court then addressed the constitutionality of
the three disputed portions of the Act.
82. Id. at 119.
83. New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2420. The majority analyzed the constitutionality of
the Act in two parts. First, the Court considered Congress's authority to pass the
law. Second, the Court addressed whether the law violated state sovereignty. Id. at
2417.
84. 42 U.S.C. § 2021e(e) (1),(2). For a discussion of the relevant portions of
the surcharge sections, see supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
85. 42 U.S.C. § 2021e(e). For a discussion of the access denial and penalty
provisions, see supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
86. New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2427.
87. 42 U.S.C. § 2021e(d) (2) (C). For a discussion of the penalty or take-title
provisons, see supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
88. New York. 112 S. Ct. at 2434. Justice O'Connor stated that a "choice between two unconstitutionally coercive regulatory techniques is no choice at all."
Id. at 2428. For a discussion of the Court's severability analysis, see infra notes 10911 and accompanying text.
89. See U.S. CONsr. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Congressional power to regulate interstate
commerce also extends to areas that may be intrastate in character, but which
influence or affect interstate commerce. See Katzenbach v. McClung, 85 S. Ct. 377
(1964).
90. New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2419-20. The disposal of waste has been deemed to
be interstate commerce. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 621-24
(1978). In City of Philadelphia,the Supreme Court struck down a New Jersey law
that banned the importation of out-of-state hazardous waste. Id. at 629. The City of
PhiladelphiaCourt rejected the suggestion that hazardous waste, because of its
worthlessness, was not an article of interstate commerce, and stated: "All objects of
interstate trade merit Commerce Clause protection; none is excluded by definition
at the outset." Id. at 622; see Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dep't
of Natural Resources, 112 S. Ct. 2019 (1992) (invalidating restrictive waste disposal
law). Since Congress regulates all interstate commerce, it has the power to regulate the disposal of LLRW. New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2419-20. Congress can also preempt any state regulation of LLRW that was contrary to federal regulations. Id.
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In a majority opinion written by Justice O'Connor, the Court
held that the Act's surcharge provisions were a permissible exercise
of congressional power because the provisions encouraged, rather
than compelled states' compliance with the Act. 91 The Court
viewed the provision that allowed states to impose a disposal fee as
an acceptable burden on interstate commerce because Congress
had unambiguously approved the burden by enacting the
LLRWPA. 92 The petitioners did not challenge the validity of the
provision that allowed the Secretary of Energy to collect a portion
of the surcharge revenue. 93 The Court also determined that the
section providing rebates to compliant states was a legitimate use of
Congress's spending power. 94 The Court noted that the receipt of
federal funds based on compliance with federal regulations has
been held to be constitutional. 9 5
The Court also validated the access denial provision of the
Act. 9 6 The exclusionary provision authorizes compacts that had

complied with the Act's deadlines to deny noncompliant states access to compact LLRW sites. 97 Under the Act, joining a compact is
the only way to secure the benefit of the access exclusion incen91. New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2425-27.
92. Id. at 2425-26. States are permitted to burden interstate commerce when
supported by an "expression of unambiguous intent of Congress." Id.
93. Id. at 2426. The petitioners argued that designating the escrow account as
the destination for the surcharge monies violated the provision that all taxes must
be paid into a general account. Id. The Court dismissed this argument, citing
examples of federal statutes that provided for segregated trust funds. Id.
94. Id. at 2426-27.
95. New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2426-27 (citing South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203
(1987)). In South Dakota v. Dole, the Court held that "Congress may attach conditions on the receipt of federal funds...." Id. at 206. At issue in Dole was a requirement that South Dakota comply with a minimum drinking age in order to receive
federal funds for highway repairs. Id.
Drawing on precedent, Dole established a four-prong test for determining
whether a conditional grant of federal funds violated the Spending Clause. First,
the condition must be intended to protect the general welfare of the states.
Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640-41 (1937) (terming it settled law that Congress may spend to aid public welfare). Second, the condition must be clearly
stated, so that the state is certain that the receipt of funds is dependent on compliance. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981) (finding
statute using language "as a condition of" was clear conditional grant of funds).
Third, the conditions must bear a reasonable relation to the federal interest being
pursued. See Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461 (1978). Finally,
there cannot be any independent constitutional bars to the conditional grant. See
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 91 (1976).
96. New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2427.
97. 42 U.S.C. § 2021e(e) (2). For further discussion of the access denial provision, see supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
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tives,98 since noncompact states could not similarly deny access to
out-of-state LLRW generators. 99
The Court upheld the Act's access denial provision because it
found that states had a choice between abiding by federal regulations, or subjecting private waste generators within the state to
higher surcharges and ultimately, the loss of access to out-of-state
disposal facilities. 10 0 The Court stated that this "choice" preserved
political accountability because states retained the power to choose
between abiding by federal standards or pursuing different state
policies.1 0 1 Without this "choice" Congress would be forcing the
siting of controversial LLRW facilities without input from the af102
fected states' citizens.
C.

The Invalidation of the Take-Title Provision

The majority concluded that the take-title provision was invalid
because it offered a choice between two unconstitutional options.10 3 Under the take-tide provision, the noncompliant state
98. 131 CONG. REc. S18,113 (daily ed. Dec. 19, 1985)(statement of Sen.
Johnston).
99. Under the Act, only states that are in a compact are permitted to deny
access. 42 U.S.C. § 2021e(e) (2); see City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S.
617, 628 (1978). For a discussion of the holding in City of Philadelphia,see supra
note 90.
100. New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2427. Justice O'Connor stated that:
States may either regulate the disposal of radioactive waste according to
federal standards by attaining local or regional self-sufficiency, or their
residents who produce radioactive waste will be subject to federal regulation authorizing sited States and regions to deny access to their disposal
sites. The affected States are not compelled by Congress to regulate, because any burden caused by a State's refusal to regulate will fall on those
who generate waste and find no outlet for its disposal, rather than on the
State as a sovereign. A State whose citizens do not wish it to attain the
Act's milestones may devote its attention and its resources to issues its
citizens deem more worthy; the choice remains at all times with the residents of the State, not with Congress.
Id.
101. Id. at 2424. The Court emphasized that local citizens had the capacity to
change federal policies that ran contrary to their interests. Id. By contrast, the
Court stated that congressional compulsion removes political accountability because state officials "bear the brunt of public disapproval, while the federal officials
who devised the regulatory program may remain insulated from the electoral
ramifications of their decision." Id.
102. While congressional regulation would result in uniform national law,
there are two drawbacks to federal regulation. First, siting of nuclear waste dumps
is local in character; only local politicians have sufficient knowledge of the land
and the populace to choose a site. Second, congressional regulation would reduce
local accountability such that neighbors of the site would have only a whisper of a
political influence in the site selection process. Merritt, supra note 62, at 61-62.
103. New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2428. The Court rejected the respondents' argument that the take-tide provision was not ripe for judicial review because it would

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1994

15

Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 5, Iss. 1 [1994], Art. 10

282

VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. V: p. 267

could either take possession of the waste and assume all liability
stemming from its possession, or it could regulate LLRW disposal
according to the Act's deadlines. 10 4 The respondents in New York
argued that the provision offered the state several valid and uncoerced options. 10 5 The majority disagreed, noting that each option resulted in direct congressional supervision or regulation of
the state. 10 6 The majority characterized the take-title provision as
federal legislation that compelled states to take action and, by so
doing, "commandeered" state resources.10 7 The Court found that
the compulsive nature of the take-title provision distinguished it
from the incentive portions of the Act. 0 8
The Court next addressed the severability of the take-title provision from the remaining constitutional provisions of the Act. 1'9
The New York Court reiterated that the severability of a single provision from a federal statute depends on the independence of the
provision from the remainder of the statute." 0 Relying on what it
termed "common sense," the Court severed the take-title provision
from the remainder of the Act."'
not be effective until 1996. Id.; see Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm., 461 U.S. 190, 200.03 (1983) (finding ripeness
turns on preventing adverse effects of certain future consequences); Pennsylvania
v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 593 (1923) ("One does not have to await the consummation of threatened injury to obtain preventive relief. If the injury is certainly impending, that is enough.") (internal quotations omitted). The Court
stated that the time needed to find and build a site was too great to dismiss the
case and rehear it in 1996. New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2428.
104. New York, 112 S. CL at 2428.
105. Id. The respondents argued that states had several options. The states
could (1) contract for disposal with another state or compact; (2) build their own
disposal facilities; or (3) permit private parties to build private LLRW facilities. Id.
106. Id. at 2429.

107. Id.
108. New York, 112 S. CL at 2428. The difference between the access incentive
and the take-title penalty lies in who the provision affects. Under the access incentive provision, if states do not comply with the milestones, private waste generators
will be taxed and lose access to waste facilities. Under the take-title provision, a
state must either comply or the state must take possession of the waste and thereby
assume all liability for damages caused by the waste. Id.
109. Id. at 2434.
110. Id. (citing Alaska Airlines v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 684-85 (1987)). The
fundamental question in determining the severability of a statutory provision is
whether the absence of the unconstitutional provision will defeat the essential purpose of the statute. Alaska Airlines v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 684-85 (1987).
111. New York, 112 S. CL at 2434. The Court noted that absent the take-title
provision, the Act still encourages states to become locally or regionally sufficient
in disposing LLRW. Id. The New York Court did not analyze the Act's legislative
history to determine the importance of the take-title provision in relation to the
constitutionally sound portions of the statute. Compare New York, 112 S. CL at 2434
with Brock, 480 U.S. at 692-97.
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The Dissenting Views

Justice White, joined by Justices Blackmun and Stevens, concurred with the majority's validation of the surcharge and access
denial provisions.' 1 2 However, the Justices dissented from the majority's invalidation of the take-title provision.1 13
Justice White asserted that New York's support of the Act
throughout the legislative process should estop it from subsequently challenging the Act's constitutionality.' 1 4 Although the majority agreed that New York received a benefit from the Act's
passage in that the Act kept the existing facilities open, the majority
did not view the receipt of such a benefit as precluding a later attack on the Act's constitutionality.' 1 5

In Brock, the Court reviewed the legislative history of the statute to determine
whether it was an essential part of the statute. Id. at 690-95. In Brock, the insignificance of the invalid provision during the legislative debate over the statute justified
the Court's severance analysis. Id.
In New York, the Court paid scant attention to the legislative history of the Act,
and did not base its severability finding on the expressed intent of Congress. New
York, 112 S. Ct. at 2434. At least two legislators commented that the sole purpose
of the Act was to add strict penalties for noncompliance to the LLRWPA. See 131
CONG. REc. S18,103-05 (daily ed. Dec. 19, 1985)(statement of Sen. Hart); 131
CONG. REc. S18,108 (daily ed. Dec. 19, 1985) (statement of Sen. Bradley).
112. New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2435 (WhiteJ, dissenting).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 2440. Adopting the respondents' estoppel argument, Justice White
wrote that New York
should be estopped from asserting the unconstitutionality of a provision
that seeks merely to ensure that, after deriving substantial advantages
from the 1985 Act, New York in fact must live up to its bargain by establishing an in-state low-level radioactive waste facility or assuming liability
for its failure to act.
Id.
The Supreme Court has stated that being a party to a compact agreement
would be sufficient to support an estoppel theory. See, e.g., West Virginia ex.rel Dyer
v. Sims, 341 U.S. 22, 35 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring) ("West Virginia officials
induced sister States to contract with her and Congress to consent to the Compact
West Virginia should be estopped from repudiating her act .... ."). Although
New York never joined a compact, the dissent viewed the Act as a compromise
agreement to which New York was a party. New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2440 (White, J.,
dissenting). The majority countered that "[t] he fact that the Act. .. embodies a
compromise among the States does not elevate the Act... to the status of an
interstate agreement requiring Congress' approval under the Compact Clause."
Id. at 2432.
115. New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2432. The Court also reasoned that New York
could not consent to an illegal provision, concluding that "[w]here Congress exceeds its authority relative to the States, .. . the departure from the constitutional
plan cannot be ratified by the 'consent' of state officials." Id. at 2431.
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Justice White stated that the majority should have analyzed New
York under the Garcia test.116 Justice White found the distinctions
drawn by the majority to be inapposite because the majority's analysis ignored the context of political compromise in which the Act
1 17
was passed.
E.

Developments in the Wake of the Supreme Court Decision

The process of locating and building acceptable LLRW disposal facilities is already behind schedule.1 18 Four competing forces
are working to further complicate and impede the process. First,
the operational sites have begun issuing edicts to states announcing
that access will be restricted unless states comply with the Act.11 9
Second, politicians are postponing siting legislation to avoid the
political ramifications associated with siting decisions.1 20 For instance, Nebraska Senator Kerry demanded a congressional investigation into the necessity of new sites, suggesting that LLRW is
decreasing at a rate that will not sustain the need for the proposed
sites. 121 Third, concerned citizens are suing states to block the sit116. Id. at 2441-43 (White,J., dissenting). For further discussion of the applicability of the Tenth Amendment cases, see infra notes 127-32 and accompanying
text.
117. Id. at 2438 (White, J., dissenting).
118. Hubler, supranote 2, at Al. New York has endured strong public opposition to its site selection process, forcing it to revise estimates of its earliest siting
date to 1998. Id. Connecticut restarted its search for a facility in 1993, with one
legislator announcing that legislative debates were a "ploy" to delay the site-selection process. Daniel P. Jones, House Rules Out Three Sites for Dump, HRToRD CouRANT, Apr. 2, 1992, at D1; Daniel P.Jones, Low-Level Waste Needs Dump; Dump Needed
for Low-Level Radioactive Waste, HARTVoRD COURANT, May 20, 1993, at Al.
119. Richard R. Zuercher, States Must Show Siting Progress or Risk LLW Facilities
Cut-Off, NUCLEONICS WEEK, July 16, 1992, at 1. As of January 1, 1993, there were
only two open LLRW sites-Barnwell and Richland (Hanford). Northwest, Southeast
Compacts only Regions with LLW Sites, NUCLEAR WAsT NEws, Jan. 7, 1993, at 1. The
Richland site will continue accepting waste from its own compact and from the
Rocky Mountain compact, pursuant to a contract, until it reaches its volume capacity. Id. The Barnwell site has existing contracts until July 1994 to accept waste
from a variety of sources at increased costs. Id. Both sites have already denied
access to Michigan in response to its dilatory siting tactics. Zuercher, supra, at 1.
The access denial was upheld when Michigan challenged it in 1990. Michigan
Coalition of Radioactive Material Users, Inc. v. Griepentrog, 954 F.2d 1174 (6th
Cir. 1992).
120. Peckinpaugh, supra note 24, at 58; see generallyJointHearings,supra note 2,
at 152 (recalling contemplated extension of LLRWPA allowed Texas legislators to
slow down siting process). Some states are delaying the process without fear of the
Act's penalties. For example, Kansas will introduce a bill proposing that it withdraw from the Central Interstate compact, so that it will not be considered for a
site. Radwaste Compact: Nebraska Expected to Reject Dump Site, GREENWIRE, Jan. 26,
1993, at 1.
121. 138 CONG. Rc. S10,983 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1992). Several studies show a
decrease in the annual volume of LLRW. Id. (statement of Sen. Kerry); Bums,
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ing process. 122 And fourth, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
has proposed new regulations that would terminate all on-site storage of LLRW,1 23 posing serious consequences for most LLRW
generators.
IV.

CRITICAL ANALYSIS

The Act's take-title provision, mandating that a state take possession of a substance that could subject the state to liability, had no
equivalent in any other another federal statute. 124 Similar statutes
imposing sanctions on states for noncompliance with federal regulations have been held unconstitutional. 2 5 Both of the choices in
the Act imposed substantial costs on the states, either through exposure to liability or in the administration of an expensive state reg12 6
ulatory program.
supra note 9, at 288-89. Any recent decrease in the annual volume of LLRW is
deceptive because it is probably due to on-site storage of waste by the generators.
See BARLEr & STEELE, supra note 1, at 186. One official of EG & G, the company
that conducts surveys for the government, attributed the fluctuation in waste numbers to increased on-site storage. Id. On-site storage is a dangerous method of
reducing disposal costs. Se Joint Hearings, supra note 2, at 300.
122. See, e.g. cases cited supra note 4.
123. 58 Fed. Reg. 6730 (Proposed Feb. 2, 1993).
124. New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2429. In its amicus brief, Connecticut echoed the
idea that the take-tide provision is unique. Brief of the State of Connecticut as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner State of New York at 9, New York v. United
States, 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992) (No. 191-543). The lawyer for the respondents
termed the take-title provision "a novel approach." Lyle Denniston, Dumping on
Congress Brings Partial Vctoy in Waste Disposal Case, AM. LAw., Sept. 1992, at 93.
125. Merritt, supra note 62, at 62-63; see, e.g. EPAv. Brown, 431 U.S. 99 (1977).
Brown was a collection of several cases that were rendered moot by changes in
government regulations. Id. at 103-04. Each case involved a federal statute which
imposed sanctions on states for failing to comply with federal regulations. Id. at
103. The government conceded that the sanctions were unconstitutional and
agreed to change the statutes, thereby rendering the cases moot. Id.
But ef. Bell v. NewJersey, 461 U.S. 773 (1983) (holding that imposition of liability for misused funds does not interfere with state sovereignty); Nevada v. Skinner, 884 F.2d 445 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1070 (1990); Delaware
Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air v. Pennsylvania, 533 F. Supp. 869, 879 (E.D.
Pa. 1982) (citing Tenth Amendment upholding constitutionality of Pennsylvania
law prohibiting expenditures for automotive emission program), affd on other
grounds, 678 F.2d 470 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 969 (1982). The statute
in Bell imposed liability on a state for misusing federal funds which it had voluntarily accepted. Bell, 461 U.S. at 788-89. The Court likened the provision to a condition imposed on the receipt of federal funds. Id. at 790-91.
126. See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 846-47 (1976). The
Court in NationalLeague considered the substantial costs imposed by the statute on
the states when it invalidated the statute. Id.; see also D. Bruce La Pierre, Political
Accountability in the NationalPoliticalPlocess: The Alternative to JudicialReview of Federalism Issues, 80 Nw. U. L. REv. 577, 657 (1985).
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The outcome in New York is laudable, but the holding is flawed
to the extent that the Court ignored precedent. The majority erred
in two areas of its analysis. First, the majority did not apply the
Garciatest. Clearly, had it done so, the Court would have found the
take-tide provision constitutional. Second, the majority relied on
dicta and inapposite cases to support its holding.
A.

The GarciaTest Should Have Been Applied

The majority did not apply existing Tenth Amendment jurisprudence to New York. 127 The majority apparently disregarded its
statement in South Carolina v. Baker'28 that "[t]he Tenth Amendment limits on Congress' authority to regulate state activities are set
out in Garcia... ."129 The Baker language requires Garcia's application to all cases that involve alleged infringements on state sovereignty. 3 0° In New York, the majority maintained that the Tenth
Amendment cases were inapplicable because in those cases Congress had subjected the states to "the same regulation applicable to
private parties." 13 ' This conclusion is unwarranted. As the dissent
noted, Virginia Mining and FERC were not decided solely on the
grounds that the legislation regulated private parties and states
2
alike.' 3
The thrust of the dispute in New York was whether the Act violated New York's sovereignty. Any inquiry into violations of state
sovereignty by federal statute must, therefore, involve the Tenth
Amendment cases. Accordingly, the Court should have either applied Garcia because it is the controlling precedent in state sovereignty jurisprudence, or it should have overruled Garcia; it did
neither.
B.

Arguments for the Validation of the Take-Tide Provision

Both the district court and the Second Circuit analyzed the Act
in terms of Garcia's political process test.13 3 The Second Circuit
127. New York, 112 S.Ct. at 2441. One commentator stated: "The opinion [ ]
undermines the theoretical underpinnings of the court's Tenth Amendment
precedents." Gary S. Hook, Clearing the Tracks for Federal Action, THE RECORDER,
Sept. 3, 1992, at 7.
128. 485 U.S. 505 (1988).
129. Id. at 512.
130. Id.
131. New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2420.
132. Id. at 2441 (White, J., dissenting).
133. New York v. United States, 942 F.2d 114 (2d Cir. 1991)(recognizing Garcia as starting point for Tenth Amendment analysis); Michigan v. United States,
773 F. Supp. 997 (D. Mich. 1991) (finding political process prevents laws that un-
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praised the broad-based state involvement in the Act's creation. 3 4
In light of this, the Supreme Court's failure to apply the Garciatest
to the Act is troubling; even the petitioners in New York conceded
that the Act was not a violation of the Tenth Amendment. 3 5 However, during arguments before the Court, the petitioners sought to
create a narrow exception to invalidate the Act, without overruling
36
Garcia.'
The Garciatest, based on the premise that the political process
protects state sovereignty, has been criticized for two reasons. First,
the underlying theory presumes that the political process will protect a state's interests, even though this assumption is probably invalid in modern politics.' 37 Second, the theory fails to delineate what
is a violation of the process.' 3 8 However, the Court's analysis in Garcia was an improvement on the reasoning in National League, which
was unclear as to what constituted "traditional government functions."139 Furthermore, despite its flaws, Garcia remains precedent
and should have been either followed or overruled by the Court in
New York. 140
There are three arguments in favor of upholding the take-title
provision. First, the Act was proposed and formulated by the states;
thus, it is not the type of coercive regulation envisioned by the New
York majority. 141 Second, the take-title provision, while recognized
duly burden states from being enacted and Michigan's legislators participated in
legislative passage of statute); New York v. United States, 757 F. Supp. 10 (N.D.N.Y.
1990).
134. New York, 942 F.2d at 119. For the language used by the Second Circuit,
see supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
135. Denniston, supra note 124, at 93.
136. See id. Peter Schiff, attorney for the petitioners, argued that the Act was
unique in mandating state action. Id. In fact, Mr. Schiff's statement, "[W] e know
of no other situation where the states have simply been mandated to take part in a
particular activity," is remarkably similar to the anti-commandeering stance
adopted by the majority. Compare Denniston, supra note 124, at 93 with New York,
112 S. Ct. at 2428.
137. Merritt, supranote 62, at 15. Professor Merritt states: "The Court's treatment of federal-state relations in Garciais wholly unsatisfactory... because Garcia's
central assertion that the structure of federal politics protects the autonomy of
state governments is simply wishful thinking." Id. Commentators have also criticized the Court for adopting a test which naively assumes that the political process
will protect the itinerant voters of the states. Id. at 15 n.88.
138. California v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 512 (1988).
139. See La Pierre, supra note 126, at 581.
140. In his dissent, Justice White argued that if the majority had applied the
Garcia test to New York, the six Justices would have concluded that the take-title
provision was the product of state-driven compromise, not the product of congressional compulsion. New York, 112 S. Ct. 2441-43 (White, J., dissenting).
141. See Hook, supra note 127, at 7; see also New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2435 (White,
J., dissenting).
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as a stringent penalty, was debated by Congress and survived intact.142 Third, the take-title provision was a necessary cost imposed
upon the states in return for the benefit of denying access to waste
143
facilities, as provided for by the statute's exclusionary language.
C.

New Yor*'s Analysis

The majority invalidated the take-tite provision in part because the provision commandeered state action. 144 However, the
Court's "commandeering" analysis rests on a foundation of dicta
and unpersuasive analysis of case law. 145 The majority stated that
the Virginia Mining decision was based solely on the statute's failure
to "comandeer" state regulation. 14 6 Furthermore, the majority ignored the Court's attempt in Virginia Mining to portray the statute
47
in Virginia Mining as the product of "cooperative federalism."1
The Court in Virginia Mining upheld that statute because it regulated private coal mine operators and not the state.' 48 The New
York majority also based its anti-commandeering formulation on
49
dicta used in the Supreme Court's decision in FERC v. Mississippi.'
This conclusion, however, is unwarranted. In fERC, the Court did
142. 131 CONG. REc. S18,113 (daily ed. Dec. 19, 1985) (statement of Sen.
Johnston); 131 CONG. REc. S18,120 (daily ed. Dec. 19, 1985)(statement of Sen.
Levin).
143. 131 CONG. REc. S18,113 (daily ed. Dec. 19, 1985)(statement of Sen.
Johnston); see Berkovitz, supra note 1, at 475, 479. The take-title language, as it
applied to compacts, can be properly termed a condition of ratification; to be approved the compact had to consent to the Act's provisions. Id. In return for accepting the take-title provision, member states of compliant compacts gained the
ability to deny access to noncompliant states. Id.
144. New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2420-21, 2428. "Congress may not simply 'commandee[r] the legislative processes of the States by directly compelling them to
enact and enforce a federal regulatory program.'" Id. at 2420 (quoting Hodel v.
Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n., 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981)).
145. Id. at 244143 (White, J., dissenting). The majority relied on dicta in
Virginia Mining. Id. at 2441.42 (White, J., dissenting). The Court upheld the Virginia Miningstatute because it did not directly regulate the states. Vtbginia Mining,
452 U.S. at 287-88.
146. New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2420.
147. See id. The Second Circuit seemed to imply that the Act was also the
product of "cooperative federalism." New York v. United States, 942 F.2d 114, 11920 (2d Cir. 1991).
148. Virginia Mining, 452 U.S. at 299.
149. New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2420. Justice O'Connor wrote in New York"[T]his
Court never has sanctioned explicitly a federal command to the States to promulgate and enforce laws and regulations." Id. (quoting FERC v. Missippi,456 U.S.
at 762 (1982)). Justice O'Connor omitted the remainder of the sentence from
FERCwhich stated: "there are instances where the Court has upheld federal statutory structures that in effect directed state decisionmakers to take or to refrain
from taking certain actions." FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. at 762.
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not validate the statute at issue solely on the grounds that it did not
compel state action.' 50
Furthermore, the majority's reliance on the Virginia Mining
and FERC v. Mississippicases is questionable because the precedential value of these holdings has not been fully understood. Commentators have expressed confusion as to whether these cases
support congressional employment of the states as regulatory
agents, which is contrary to Justice O'Connor's state sovereignty rationale. 5 1 In addition, the Court has also expressed doubts
whether the anti-commandeering language, relied on by the majority in New York, survived Garcia.152 Thus, the Court's failure to address Garciain the New York decision, while relying on two cases that
are arguably ambiguous, has created considerable confusion.
V.

A.

IMPACT

New York's Effects on the States and Industry

As a practical matter, the Supreme Court in New York ignored
the realities involved in siting new LLRW facilities. States will not
expedite their site-selection process because they face no penalties
for failing to comply with the Act.' 53 Examples abound of states
that are already locked in litigation or engaged in political squab1 54
bles over LLRW disposal siting decisions.
Another result of the New York decision is that noncompliant,
noncompact states will not incur penalties for failing to meet the
Act's deadlines, but private generators within the state, forced to
150. PERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. at 758-68. In FERC, the Court found that the
energy statute forced states to implement federal regulations, and to that extent, it
constituted congressional pre-emption of the area. Id. The language of the statute
permitted states to consider implementing federal regulations. Id. at 746-48. The
Court emphasized that the possibility of pre-emption was a strong inducement, but
it was not coercion for the states to implement federal guidelines. Id. at 766-67.
151. Berkovitz, supra note 1, at 472; La Pierre, supra note 126, at 608-09, 616;
Merritt, supra note 62, at 60-61. Berkovitz stated that "[b]y treating fERC as a preemption case, . . . the majority left unresolved the issue of whether the federal
government can command a state to act in furtherance of federal goals." Id.
152. California v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 512-13 (1988). The Court stated: "The
extent to which the Tenth Amendment claim left open in FERC survives Garca...
is far from clear." Id. at 513; see also Nevada v. Skinner, 884 F.2d 445, 448, 453-54
(9th Cir. 1989) (recognizing that some parts of PERC may survive Garcia), cert. de-

nied, 493 U.S. 1070 (1990).
153. Todd Woody, State's Radioactive Dump: Is It too Hot to Handle?, THE REJune 30, 1992, at 1 (stating New York decision "may have removed the gun
from California lawmakers' heads . . . ."). Id.
154. For further discussion of these problems, see supra notes 4, 118 and accompanying text.
CORDER,
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store their own waste, may incur substantial tort liability. 155 Justice
White predicted that severing the Act's take-title provision will ultimately subject states to indemnification suits for failing to take action to comply with the Act. 156 State inaction will eventually cost
157
private generators the right to dispose LLRW in other states.
The costs produced by the lack of access to LLRW facilities,
and the concomitant increased surcharges at the operating facilities,1 58 create a dilemma for certain industries. Those industries
must decide to either store LLRW on-site or discontinue the use of
radioactive materials. The dangers associated with storing LLRW
on site are easily imagined.15 9 The increasing use of on-site storage
portends that many private waste generators will be sued for damages caused by on-site environmental exposure to LLRW. The alternative, discontinuing the use of radioactive materials, would
have a crippling effect on the energy industry and the medical research and treatment industries.16°
B.

The Future and Possible Solutions

One legislative solution to the LLRW problem would be to reinstate the take-title provision so that it applies only to compacts.
Compacts are not treated as states; rather, they are interstate agreements without individual state sovereignty. 161 Due to their unique
nature, compacts are immune from the anti-commandeering lan155. See Woody, supra note 153, at 1. Woody suggests that generators that
store waste on site will be subject to tort actions for damages caused by exposure to
their waste. Woody, supra note 153, at 1.
156. New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2445 (White,J., dissenting). One lawyer projected
that California will face lawsuits caused by the stockpiling of radioactive waste.
Woody, supra note 153, at 1.
157. Leonard S. Greenberger & Kristen Smyth, Supreme Court Weakens LowLevel Waste Law, PuB. UTIL. FORT., Aug. 1, 1992, at 1
158. Northwest, Southeast Compacts only Regions with LLW Sites, NucLERa WASTE
NEWS, Jan. 7, 1993, at 1 (noting Barnwell's surcharges tripled).
159. Betsy Tompkins, FrustrationAbounds ConcerningDisposal, NucLEAR NEws,
Jan. 1993, at *1 available in LEXIS Nexis Library, Magazine file. A dangerous sideeffect caused by the disposal crisis is the emergence of unlicensed private disposal
facilities. Id. Such facilities are rife with safety hazards and corruption. Id.
160. Robert Reinhold, States, Failingto Cooperate, Face a Nuclear-Waste Crisis,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 1992, at Al. In Michigan, the Veteran's Administration Hospital sends patients out of the state for procedures involving radioactive materials.
Meanwhile, 36,000 cubic feet of LLRW is in storage. Id. One hospital official commented: "I am not going to allow anybody to generate large quantities of radioactive waste until I know where I will dispose of it. We will have to ask, 'Can we do
that kind of research?'" Id.
161. For a discussion of compacts, see supra note 7.
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guage referred to in New York.162 Since the Supreme Court has upheld legislation requiring compact member states to waive their
constitutional rights, 163 legislation that predicated the take-title provision on membership in a compact could be upheld on similar
grounds. Therefore, Congress could amend the Act by applying
the take-title provision solely to compacts that failed to comply with
federal regulation.
In New York, by avoiding the Garcia test, the Supreme Court
gave little guidance as to the status of state sovereignty law. To clarify its position, the Court should consider adopting a balancing test
that would first require the federal government to demonstrate a
national interest in the legislation. An example of such an interest
is the need to regulate low-level waste disposal before it overwhelms
the nation's existing disposal infrastructure. The state could then
prevent federal regulation only by establishing a lack of political
accountability by federal legislators, or by showing that there are
compelling local interests that countervail the national interest.
The Supreme Court, in severing the take-title provision, has
left a confusing test for determining whether state sovereignty has
been violated. Only by revisiting Garcia can the Court clarify what
standard it will apply during future review of state sovereignty
violations.
Without action by the government, either amending the Act at
the federal level or establishing new sites on the state level, the nation's low-level waste disposal system will be overwhelmed. As a result, courts will continue to be deluged with litigation attempting to
block proposed LLRW sites. Intergovernmental cooperation is imperative to solving the LLRW disposal shortage.
Rhett Traband
162. 131 CONG. REc. S18,113 (daily ed. Dec. 19, 1985) (statement of Sen.
Johnston).
The liability for consequential damages is not being imposed on the
States. The States that enter into compacts accept the terms of the legislation we are enacting. By entering into compacts, States assume the risk
that they may incur the penalties set forth in the act for failure to comply
with its provisions. In return for assumption of this risk, these States receive the benefits of the act, chief of which is the right to exclude lowlevel radioactive waste ....
Id.
163. See Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275 (1959) (upholding compact legislation waiving individual states' immunity as condition of
joining compact). Even the dissent in Petty agreed that Congress may attach conditions to compact membership which waive constitutional rights of the states. Id. at
285-86 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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